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technology on the exploration activities of the major international petroleum 
companies and find that they have aggressively increased petroleum exploration 
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a possible explanation for the recent wave of large-scale mergers in the industry. 
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This paper addresses the impact of cost-saving technological innovation on 
competitive behaviour. More particularly, the possibility that there may be an 
intensification of industry competition is examined. Examination of this issue is 
significant as it is usually assumed that firms will benefit from adopting cost-saving 
technology. This presumption holds for an individual firm adopting technology, but a 
beneficial outcome is far from assured when the oligopolistic interaction of firm 
adoption strategies is considered. 
Competitive responses to actions of rivals are central in the analysis of firm 
behaviour under oligopoly. In non-cooperative oligopoly in the tradition of Cournot 
([1838], 1897), responses to the output levels of rivals are depicted using reaction 
curves. We utilize the concept of a reaction curve in exploration activity to examine 
behaviour of petroleum companies in response to the introduction of a new 
technology, namely three-dimensional seismic mapping (3D), which has supplanted 
two-dimensional seismic mapping (2D) in many areas. The new technology facilitates 
exploration for oil reserves and reduces the cost of looking for reservoirs in new 
places, especially offshore at substantial depths.  
There is a substantial theoretical literature on technological competition 
among firms in oligopoly, focussing largely on the speed and intensity of firm efforts 
to find new products and processes (see Reinganum, 1989 for a review and 
Doraszelski, 2003 for a recent contribution that focuses on reactions between a 
technological leader and followers). This modelling suggests the net payoff to firms 
varies in subtle ways with the costs of undertaking the competition. In applying the 
modelling approach to changes in the cost of research effort, Voola and Kilminster 
(2003) show that a reduction in the cost of undertaking research may in some 
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circumstances leave firms worse off after the cost reduction. Likewise, a reduction in 
the cost of finding new oil deposits may lead individual petroleum companies to 
collectively spend so much more on exploration that they are left collectively worse 
off, with an aggregate change in net present value that is negative. 
In a rare empirical study of reactions in technological competition, Grabowski 
and Baxter (1973) estimate competitive reactions in research and development (R&D) 
expenditures by large chemical firms in the US and find that chemical firms react 
positively to R&D expenditures by their rivals. We employ a similar approach in 
estimating competitive reactions in exploration expenditure by the world’s largest 
petroleum companies. We also find evidence of positive reactions, with exploration 
expenditures by petroleum firms positively related to expenditures by their rivals. 
Further, our results show that the introduction of 3D seismic technology led to 
increased spending by the firms, which combined with the positive feedback in 
expenditure among firms, implies an aggressive expansion in exploration efforts after 
the introduction of 3D technology. 
In the following section, we explain our approach to modelling competitive 
reactions in exploration expenditures. Section 3 discusses the data set used in 
estimation, while Section 4 present the results of estimating exploration expenditure 
equations for a panel of the major petroleum companies. We conclude with discussion 
of the implications of our findings for assessing competition in the petroleum industry 
and interpreting the recent wave of mergers among major companies. 
 
2. Empirical Model  
The standard approach to modelling exploration activities considers the cost of 
exploration and the expected return to an individual firm acting independently as a 
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price taker (see Krautkraemer, 1998 for a general discussion of modelling exploration 
for non-renewable natural resources). When applied to petroleum firms operating in a 
specific exploration area, this approach emphasises the user cost (in situ value) of new 
discoveries and the ‘discovery decline phenomenon’ (cumulative exploration effort 
has a negative impact on expected further discoveries). Pesaran (1990), Favero 
(1992), Pickering (2002) and Kemp and Kasim (2003), among others, apply this 
approach to estimating regressions for exploration efforts of firms operating on the 
UK Continental Shelf and find that exploration effort, as measured by number of 
exploratory and appraisal wells drilled, rises with measures related to the price or user 
cost of oil and falls with the cumulative amount of previous exploration effort, at least 
after some critical threshold. Some of the studies also find evidence of an impact of 
the taxation regime applied by the British government. 
 Our study differs in its focus from studies mentioned above. First, we are 
especially interested in the world petroleum industry, so we measure exploration 
effort by the major petroleum companies across all geographic areas. Second, we are 
interested in the impact of the change in technology, namely the development of 3D 
seismic exploration methods to supplant 2D seismic in some prospective areas, 
particularly in the search for offshore reservoirs in deep water. Because we are 
examining exploration effort over disparate areas and disparate methods, we use 
exploration effort rather than the number of wells drilled as our dependent variable 
measuring exploration effort.  
 Our choice of explanatory variables is also influenced by our focus. We 
examine the role of oligopolistic interactions by using competitor exploration 
expenditures as an explanatory variable. Likewise, because of our interest in the 
impact of the change in seismic technology, we use a dummy variable to measure the 
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time at which each company adopted the new 3D technology. In some models of 
oligopoly access to funds is an important influence on firm behaviour, so we include a 
operating profits as an explanatory variable. Finally, due to the substantial differences 
in sizes of companies in our sample, we use firm size measured in sales as a control in 
our set of explanatory variables. 
The empirical relationship estimated in this paper is of the form: 
 
itititititiit ελXπXηXβXαE  4321       (1) 
 
In (1), itE  is the amount of exploration expenditure by company i in period t, iα  is the 
fixed effect associated with company i (sometimes assumed to be uniform across 
companies), itX 1  is the ith company’s own profit in period t; itX 2  is company i size in 
period t; itX 3  is a dummy variable whether company i has introduced 3D technology 
in period t and itX 4  is the aggregated value of competitor exploration expenditures for 
company i in period t.  All variables, other than the dummy variable, are measured in 
natural logarithms so that the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities of 
exploration expenditures with respect to the particular variable. 
We expect each company’s exploration expenditures to vary positively with 
company size (due to the wider range of activity) and with profits (as a measure of the 
ability to finance risky investments that might act as a barrier to entry, a so-called 
‘long purse’). The cost reduction for exploration effort associated with the 
introduction of 3D technology increases the optimal level of exploration effort. If this 
increase is large enough to offset the reduced cost of such effort, total expenditure 
rises and the coefficient of the 3D dummy variable is positive. Following Grabowski 
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and Baxter (1973) we expect that there is rivalry in exploration expenditures, so that 
the coefficient on competitors’ exploration expenditure is positive. 1  
 
3. Data Set  
We use data for the seven major international petroleum companies, Amoco, British 
Petroleum (BP); Chevron, Exxon, Mobil, Shell and Texaco, for the years 1975 
through to 2000. The data set includes companies that merged in the later years (BP 
and Amoco merged on 31st December 1998, Exxon and Mobil merged on 30th of 
November 1999).  In order to accommodate for this, the data set is expanded to nine 
companies instead of seven, with the merged entities treated as separate companies. 
This means that we have an unbalanced panel of data, with BP and Amoco, leaving 
the sample in 1998 and the new entity, BPAmoco, entering the sample in replacement. 
Likewise, Exxon and Mobil leave the sample in 1999 and are replaced by the new 
entity, ExxonMobil. In the year 2000 these companies in the current merged entities 
accounted for approximately 55% of total world sales of crude petroleum, with 
ExxonMobil at 20%, Shell at 14%, BPAmocco at 12%, Texaco at 4.5% and Chevron 
also at 4.5% according to Standard and Poor (2000).  
The data for each company includes annual exploration expenditures, Eit, 
where i indicates the identity of the company and t the year of the observation. 
Competitor’s expenditures are taken to be the aggregate for the other players, 
  ij jtit EX 4 , where j stands for each of the companies in the sample. Exploration 
expenditures (variables E and X4) are both in US dollar values (in millions), as this is 
the original stated value for all companies except British Petroleum and Shell. Data 
for the latter companies are in pounds and are converted into US dollars at the average 
exchange rate for that year. The profits (X1) and sales (X2) of individual firms are 
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similarly reported in millions of US dollars for United States based companies and 
converted from British pounds for British Petroleum and Shell, where the latter 
amounts are converted into US dollar equivalents at average exchange rates as above. 
The change-over dates of 2D to 3D seismic (X3) is captured by the use of a 
dummy variable, so that a value of 1 applies from the year of introduction of 3D 
seismology and the value of 0 applies previously. The years of introduction of the 
new technology, 3D is approximate, and based on information that has been gathered 
from various industry sources. The particular challenge in capturing the switching 
dates from 2D to 3D lies in the fact the introduction of 3D was gradual and 
considerable amount of experimentation with the technology was undertaken in 
patches.2 Hence, identifying and associating particular times of introduction requires 
the use of judgement.3 An appeal to anecdotal evidence, personal communication and 
reference to industry material is used in constructing the date of introduction of 3D.   
Exxon is designated 1982 (Greenlee and Johnson 1994, p370) and Mobil 1981 
(Bakerhouse, 2001) for the introduction of 3D seismic. British Petroleum is 
designated 1988, where this later year of introduction of 3D is due to a deliberate 
management decision to not involve themselves with the 3D (Lee, 2001). Amoco is 
assigned 1989, as the company is classified one of the herd, and generally followed 
the industry trend in absorption of the technology. Shell is assigned 1985 (Moody-
Stuart 1993, p.271) and Chevron, given the absence of indicators of early adoption is 
assigned the late year of 1989. Texaco is assigned 1985 in accordance to the industry 
average, as well as according to Krail (2002). 
The data are deflated by the price of a barrel of oil (in US dollars). This means 
exploration expenditure and other nominal magnitudes are expressed in terms of 
barrel of oil equivalents. This a convenient way to remove fluctuations in the sales 
 8
variable that are due to changes in oil prices. The other nominal magnitudes, 
exploration expenditures and profits, do not necessarily move in proportion to oil 
prices. For these variables, deflation by the price oil may not precisely remove the 
impact of inflation.4 
 
4. Estimation Results 
The model specified in equation (1) study is estimated with the use of cross-section 
and time-series data.  In this particular instance, the cross section of the sample is the 
nine firms: Amoco, BP, BPAmoco, Chevron, Exxon, ExxonMobil, Mobil, Shell and 
Texaco. The time series is for the observations for the 26 years 1975 through to 2000. 
For the companies that merge late in the sample period, there are no observations for 
the separate companies in the years after merger and no observations for the merged 
companies early in the sample period. Thus, the sample constitutes an unbalanced 
panel of observations, with 26 observations each for Chevron, Shell and Texaco, 23 
observations for BP and Amoco, 24 observations for Exxon and Mobil; three 
observations for BPAmoco, and two observations for ExxonMobil. 
The POOL command in Shazam (Version 9) is used to estimate the 
regressions.  Shazam uses the Parks (1967) method as described in Kmenta (1986, 
section 12.2, pp. 616-625) and Greene (1993, section 16.3), which employs a set of 
assumptions that the disturbance covariance matrix is cross-sectionally 
heteroskedastic and time-wise autoregressive. We run several regressions, with and 
without company dummies as well as with and without allowing coefficients of the 
explanatory variables to vary across companies.5 We also use instrumental variables 
estimation to allow for the possibility that the explanatory variables for operating 
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profits and competitor’s exploration expenditures are determined simultaneously with 
the company’s own exploration expenditures. 
Equation (1) is estimated using the ordinary least square (OLS) option with 
pooling of the data across the unbalanced sample. In the first regression, we assume 
that the disturbance term in equation (2) is identically distributed for each company 
and for each time period. A heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrix for pooled 
regression models as discussed in Beck and Katz (1995) is used. All data are in 
natural logarithms except for dummy variables. The results from this estimation are 
given in the first column of Table 1. 
 The results in column 1 of Table 1 are disappointing. Only some 24 percent of 
the variance of expenditures from the mean is explained. Only firm size is a highly 
significant, with a positive impact on exploration expenditures. As firm size and 
exploration expenditures are both measured in logarithms, the coefficient of firm size 
provides an estimate of the elasticity of expenditures, so the fact that it is less than one 
indicates that the ratio of expenditures to sales is decreasing with firm size. The 
coefficient of operating profits is marginally significant, but is negative contrary to 
expectations. The 3D introduction dummy is not significantly different from zero, 
suggesting that the introduction of 3D technology has not impacted on exploration 
expenditures by the major petroleum firms. Finally, the coefficient of exploration by 
rivals is highly significant and negative, contrary to finding of aggressive rivalry in 
R&D spending by chemical firms found by Grabowski and Baxter (1973).6 
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Table 1: OLS Regressions for Company Exploration Expenditures (Standard 
errors in parentheses) 







Constant 2.118 (1.99)** 1.76 (2.10)** 8.303 ((0.68) 
Firm Size 0.618 (5.36)* 0.223 (1.98)**  
Operating Profit -0.081 (1.69)*** -0.076 (2.56)** -0.078 (2.74)* 
3D Dummy (introduction) 0.079 (0.68) 0.148 (2.08)** 0.226 (3.18)* 
Exploration Expenditure by 
Competitors 
-0.522 (3.79)* 0.452 (4.93)* 0.516 (5.58)* 
Amoco -1.996 (8.69)* -5.437 (0.44) 
BP -0.825 (4.78)* -7.341 (0.59) 
Chevron -2.44 (11.82)* -6.488 (0.53) 
Exxon -2.061 (13.82)* -9.875 (0.80) 
Mobil -2.571 (14.06)* -9.807 (0.80) 
Shell -1.789 (12.11)* -8.786 (0.71) 
Texaco -2.737 (12.45)* -0.919 (0.07) 
ExxonMobil -1.95 (6.27)* -38.432 (3.15)* 
Amoco * Firm Size  -0.278 (1.39) 
BP * Firm Size  0.162 (0.62) 
Chevron * Firm Size  -0.175 (0.81) 
Exxon* Firm Size  0.316 (2.01)** 
Mobil * Firm Size  0.248 (1.44) 
Shell * Firm Size  0.220 (1.75)*** 
Texaco * Firm Size  -0.947 (1.63) 
ExxonMobil * Firm Size  3.442 (47.7)* 
BPAmoco * Firm Size -0.578 (0.41) 
 
F statistic from the mean 13.725* 59.939* 34.80* 
R Square 0.237 0.798 0.817 
Variance of the estimate 2 0.366 0.105 0.100 
Wald test for joint significance of 
dummies with 8 df 
 490.2* 1047* 
Wald test for joint significance of 
interactions with 8 df 
  936.6* 




The above method of pooled analysis assumes that there are no non-random 
differences in the determinants of exploration expenditures across the companies in 
the sample. If company differences are non-random in their effect on the dependent 
variable, misspecification error occurs. We therefore estimate a pooled analysis with 
company dummy variables, with the results shown in the second column of Table 1. 
The constant term is retained in the regression in the second column, so only eight 
company dummies are included. The constant term gives the ‘fixed effect’ for the 
company without a dummy, namely BPAmocco. The ‘fixed effect’ for each of the 
other companies is given by the sum of the constant and the coefficient of the dummy 
for that company. 
Allowing for fixed effects associated with companies, leads to a substantial 
increase in explanatory power moving from Column 1 to Column 2 in Table 1. The R2 
increases from 0.237 to 0.798, while the F statistic value increases from 13.725 to 
59.939.  Further, the Wald test statistic for the joint significance of the company 
dummy variables is 490.2, which is significant at the 0.001 level.  Thus, there is clear 
evidence of ‘fixed effects’ associated with the individual companies. The company-
specific fixed effect is positive for the omitted company, BPAmoco, as indicated by 
the positive and statistically significant constant term. However, all other company 
fixed effects are smaller, as indicated by the negative and highly significant 
coefficients for each of the separate company dummy variables. 
Comparison of corresponding coefficient estimates between Column 1 and 
Column 2 in Table 1 indicates the impact of the misspecification due to the failure to 
allow for company differences. In particular, the coefficient of the 3D introduction 
dummy doubles in magnitude and becomes statistically significant at the five percent 
level, providing evidence that the new technology has increased exploration 
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expenditures (as well as increasing effort). Even more dramatic is switch is sign of the 
coefficient on the exploration expenditures by rivals, which becomes positive rather 
than negative and is statistically significant at the one percent level. Thus, allowing 
for company effects reveals an aggressive response of firms to competitor exploration 
expenditures, which supports the expectation based on the work of Grabowski and 
Baxter (1973). The magnitude of the other estimated coefficients is affected but there 
are no dramatic changes in sign or statistical significance. 
Given the importance of company-specific effects, we also check for the 
possibility of differences across companies in the slope coefficients that relate the 
dependent variable to each of the explanatory variables. The only variable for which 
we find evidence of differing slopes across companies is firm size. The results that are 
obtained when the impact of firm size on exploration expenditures is allowed to vary 
across the companies are shown in Column 3 of Table 1.7  
While only a few of the company-specific coefficients for firm size are clearly 
different from zero using a t test, the Wald test statistic for all the coefficients being 
identical has a value of 936.6, which is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. 
Thus, there is clear evidence that the impact of firm size on exploration expenditures 
differs across the firms in the sample.  
Inclusion of the company-specific firm-size variables clearly affects the 
magnitude and significance of the company-specific fixed effects. The low statistical 
significance of the company-specific effects in Column 3 can be attributed to the fact 
that by construction these company dummies are highly co-linear with the company-
specific firm-size variables. Importantly, none of the other estimated coefficients is 
substantially affected in terms of sign, magnitude or statistical significance by 
inclusion of company-specific effects of firm size. 
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The coefficient of each interaction variable in Column 3 shows the elasticity 
of exploration expenditures with respect to the size of that company. It is interesting 
to note that the only statistically significant coefficients are for the two largest 
companies prior to the mergers, Exxon and Shell, and, especially, for the largest 
company after the mergers, namely ExxonMobil. These large companies apparently 
have a clear strategy of further enhancing their size through expanding exploration 
efforts to keep up with their growth. Not surprisingly Exxon (even prior to the 
merger) and Shell are the two companies that dramatically increased their shares of 
world oil production during the sample period of the last quarter of the 20th century. 
As a final check on the specification of the results reported in Table 1, we re-
estimate each of the regressions using instrumental variables (IV) estimation in place 
of OLS. We are particularly concerned with the possibility that exploration 
expenditures have an impact both on operating profits (through an accounting 
relationship to the degree that exploration expenditures are expensed) and on 
exploration expenditures by competitors (as a firm’s expenditures are part of the 
expenditures of competitors for each of the other firms). Following standard practice, 
we use the lagged values of operating profits and exploration expenditures by 
competitors as our instrumental variables when treating the current values of these 
two variables as endogenous.  
Comparing the IV results to those in the corresponding column in Table 1 
indicates that the use of IV estimation generally produces less precise results than 
OLS estimation. This is indicated by lower t-ratios of individual regression 
coefficients and lower overall value of the R2. However, the pattern of results is quite 
similar, particularly concerning the coefficients on our key variables of interest, the 
3D introduction dummy and the exploration expenditures by competitors.8 Thus, 
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simultaneous equation bias does not seem to affect conclusions on the determinants of 
exploration expenditures drawn from the regression results in Table 1.9  
One of the important issues that we examine is the response of individual 
companies to the change in the new technology, (3D). The new technology effectively 
reduces the cost of finding oil. Firms in the industry could respond by reducing their 
exploration expenditures, which effectively means, “saving the cost reduction”. The 
empirical analysis shows, however, that there is a positive relationship between the 
introduction of 3D seismic and exploration expenditures. This indicates that 
companies in the sample set have responded to the new technology’s cost-reducing 
effect, not by staying indifferent to the amounts of expenditures and exploration effort 
that they spend, but by increasing both effort and expenditure.  This response is 
further augmented by aggressive behaviour between players in the industry with 
respect to exploration expenditures, as indicated by the positive and highly significant 
coefficient on the competitor’s expenditure variable. 
 
5. Interpretation and Discussion of Results 
The empirical results permit the following two conclusions. First, the use of the new 
seismic mapping technology is associated with increased exploration expenditures by 
the major petroleum companies. Companies did not pocket the ‘savings’ that the new 
technology permitted in terms of increased efficiency in exploration, but increased 
their exploration activity in response to the new technology.  Second, the empirics 
show that the firms in the industry respond positively to each other in terms of 
exploration expenditures. 
Both of these results set the condition for a prisoner’s dilemma outcome to 
occur, where individually rational strategies conflict with group success. Expansion of 
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exploration expenditures by individual companies following the introduction of 3D 
technology has led to increase in reserves and output of oil, putting downward 
pressure on prices. Under such a situation, cooperative behaviour can emerge as a 
solution to resolving the worsening outcomes for individual players. In the context of 
our findings, it is interesting to note that there has been a wave of mega mergers in the 
petroleum industry in the ten to twenty years subsequent to the introduction of 3D 
seismic technology. Perhaps, the companies have decided that mergers are required to 
avoid the type of ruinous competition that followed their adoption of 3D technology.  
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1 Cumulative exploration expenditure is not included as a variable because the 
exploration expenditures are not limited to a single prospective area. The introduction 
of 3D technology has expanded the range of geography over which oil exploration is 
potentially profitable to include offshore deepwater prospects. Also, the price of oil is 
excluded as an explanatory variable because all our nominal magnitudes, including 
exploration expenditures, are deflated by the price of oil, so there is a potential for a 
spurious relationship between the price of oil and the dependent variable. 
2 The timing of the introduction of the new technology is assigned a point in time, 
when in reality the switch over dates of 3D seismic have not been discrete. 
3 Incorrect assignment of the date of introduction of 3D technology introduces error 
into the dummy variable measure. The estimated coefficient of the variable in 
regression analysis is then biased towards zero and its significance understated. 
Nonetheless, we are able to establish a positive and significant coefficient in the 
regression results reported below. 
4 No specific deflator is available for either exploration expenditures or profits and 
general price deflators are for individual countries, whereas we are concerned with teh 
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worldwide activities of petroleum companies. The price of oil provides a relevant, 
albeit imperfect, general deflator. 
5 We also experiment with regressions that allow for variation across time in 
regression results not reported here. The influence of time is not generally statistically 
significant. Pickering (2002) in a study of exploration effort on the UK continental 
shelf using a different conceptual model and set of explanatory variables also finds 
significant company effects but no significant time effects. 
6 In a Cournot model with firms making output decision, each firm has a downward 
sloping reaction function, showing that its profit-maximizing output declines as the 
output of rivals increase. Applying this concept to exploration expenditures would 
suggest a negative relationship of own expenditures and expenditures by rivals as 
found in Column 1 of Table 1. 
7 The original firm size variable is excluded and replaced with a separate variable 
obtained by multiplying firm size by each company dummy variable. 
8 Full results for the IV estimates are available from the authors. Further results 
estimate OLS regressions with lagged values of operating profits and exploration 
expenditures by competitors. The results are similar to those reported in Table 1. 
These results may also be obtained from the authors on request. 
9 These conclusions are also supported by further results in Voola (2002) using a 
balanced panel of firms with the merged firms combined retrospectively. 
